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Abstract
The assurance of process safety plays an important role in the field of information technology. Securing the information has become 
one of the biggest challenges in the present day. Whenever we think about the protected systems the first thing that comes to 
our mind can be malicious interventions which are increasing immensely day by day. Nowadays we live the world of huge automotive 
developments with the appearance of the demand for autonomous vehicles. On the other hand, technological developments also 
provide a lot of advantages for the society. The benefits of autonomous cars include reduced mobility costs, increased safety, 
increased mobility, significant reduction of traffic collisions. However, it cannot be forgotten that the extension of cyberspace affects 
the transportation increasingly. Accordingly, cars are produced with high level of connectivity and automation. Therefore, the risks 
arriving from the cyberspace can now endanger the safe and secured transportation. These tendencies shall motivate manufacturers 
and developers to permanently improve the ability of vehicles to protect themselves and their passengers.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, the world can be characterized by a significant 
development process in the field of automotive industry 
in which the demand for autonomous transportation sys-
tems plays a crucial role (Tettamanti et al., 2016). The ben-
efits of autonomous cars include reduced mobility costs, 
increased safety, increased mobility, significant reduction 
of traffic collisions (Zöldy, 2018). It is strongly expected, 
that autonomous transportation will provide more efficient 
mobility patterns, especially considering road transporta-
tion of goods and passengers.
Autonomous cars combine a lot of technology solu-
tions in order to perform the autonomous driving 
(Checkoway et al., 2011). This includes the precise detec-
tion of the vehicle's position on the map (Szíjj et al., 2015), 
and also the precise detection of the objects which sur-
round the car. To be able to perform this, cars use wide 
variety of sensors (radar sensors, LIDAR sensors, ultra-
sonic sensors, computer vision). These sensors provide 
a huge amount of data, and it is not a trivial task to process 
these data. In order to fulfil the functional requirements, 
we need to have better and better ECUs in the car.
It is only one side of the problem to perform the calcula-
tions in suitable time. It is also an important task to comply 
with the safety requirements, since now the ECUs will con-
trol the car, and a failure would risk the life of the passen-
gers. Since the number of connected devices increases per-
manently, the task of connecting vehicles in the big system 
is even more difficult than before .... With other words, it is 
already obvious for people that everything is connected and 
synchronized, so they also want their cars to be connected. 
Of course this results in a huge amount of advantages, 
for example the possibility of communicating with the road 
side objects and other cars to gather data about other vehi-
cle's positions and movement, traffic and road conditions 
(v2x communication), it is easier to apply software updates, 
and there can be applications which may give information 
to the car owner even if he is outside the car. However, on the 
other hand, the car's connection channels with the outside 
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world can also cause vulnerabilities for malicious interven-
tions Therefore nowadays it is one of the most important top-
ics to protect vehicles from cyberattacks.
In the IT world there are already a lot of established 
process which can support the identification and exploita-
tion of system vulnerabilities. In case of cars, considering 
the embedded characteristic of the systems, the methodol-
ogies may be slightly different.
The scope of this paper is to investigate the main con-
cepts applied to break the vehicular security system, and 
to identify the applicable techniques in detecting and pre-
venting attacks by developing a novel ranking system 
focusing on the security level of the analyzed framework.
2 Literature review
Modern cars are controlled by complex distributed com-
puter systems comprising millions of lines of code exe-
cuted on a lot of different microcontrollers, which 
are connected to several networks inside the vehicle. 
This structure offers a huge amount of advantages on the 
field of safety and cost efficiency, however it also creates 
some vulnerabilities which can be exploited by attackers. 
In the next section the most relevant attack methods a clas-
sified (Checkoway et al., 2011).
2.1 Indirect physical access attacks
In modern vehicles there are several physical interfaces 
which access the vehicle's internal networks either directly 
or indirectly. The most significant (and well known) auto-
motive interface is the OBD-II port, which usually gives 
direct access to the vehicle's internal CAN bus (Controller 
Area Network) and provides access to several automotive 
systems. In most cases the OBD-II port is used by service 
personnel during car maintenance to read out the error code, 
which helps the diagnostics, and it is also possible to pro-
gram the ECUs through the OBD-II port, for example 
in case of a software update (Szíjj et al., 2015). Historically 
during these analysis processes dedicated "scan" tools 
were used, but nowadays the approach is rather PC cen-
tric. This means that the mechanic uses a laptop computer 
as a "PassThru" device, which is connected to the car's 
ODB-II port via USB or WiFi. After the connection is ini-
tiated, the software on the laptop computer enables either 
to read out information from the ECUs of the car, or to pro-
gram them. Summing up, an operation system based com-
puter (mostly windows based) controls the data which is sent 
to the vehicle. Such laptops are typically internet connected, 
so it is possible to hack these laptops with "traditional" 
methods from the IT world. It is easy to imagine, if a lap-
top in a garage is infected, and it is used with several vehi-
cles, it can apply malicious software to several cars. It makes 
the situation worse, that nowadays, in the world of inter-
net, also incompetent persons try to connect to the OBD-II 
port at home, which can be easily managed without having 
an idea how dangerous the situation is. Furthermore, elec-
tric vehicles may also communicate with external chargers 
via the charging cable. If an attacker is able to compromise 
the external charging infrastructure, it can affect any vehi-
cles which are using that charging network.
The other important groups of physical interfaces 
belong to the entertainment systems. All cars are shipped 
today with a CD player which is able to handle several 
audio formats. Similarly, the manufacturers also provide 
other type of external media ports (typically USB port or 
phone docking port), which allow the car owner to connect 
a mobile phone, and control the car's media system with it. 
It is a risk that an attacker can somehow deliver malicious 
programs by encoding it to a CD or a song file (for exam-
ple using social engineering), or can hack the car owner's 
phone and install a software on it which attacks the car's 
media system. Of course a CD player can have limited 
effect on the driver (it is a good question how limited 
it, if the music starts with full volume after silence on a 
congested motorway section), but these media systems 
are not standalone devices. They are usually connected 
to an internal network, so a compromised CD player can 
offer an opportunity to attack automotive components.
2.2 Short-range wireless access attacks
The main difference of short-range wireless access com-
pared to the indirect physical access is that the access cri-
teria against the attacker are less strict. It is assumed, that 
an attack surface (Miller and Valasek, 2014; SAE, 2016) is 
left unprotected on the car, which is operating over short 
ranges. These include Bluetooth, Remote Keyless Entry, 
RFIDs, Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, WiFi, and 
Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC). It is 
also assumed, that the attacker has a short range wireless 
transmitter within the car's operation range (between 5 m 
and 300 m, depending on channel).
Compared to indirect physical access, here the opera-
tional requirements are weakened related to the attacker 
and the attack path is considered to be operated over short 
range. These include Bluetooth, Remote Keyless Entry, 
RFIDs, Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, WiFi, and 
Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC). In case 
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of this attack type it is assumed that the perpetrator is able 
to place a wireless transmitter close to the car's receiver 
(between 5 and 300 meters depending on the applied com-
munication channel (Checkoway et al., 2011)).
Bluetooth has become a standard communication chan-
nel in case of supporting hands-free phone-conversation 
in automobiles and is a standard technology in most of 
the vehicles. The lowest level of the Bluetooth protocol is 
typically implemented on a hardware level, but the higher 
level protocols (management, services) are already imple-
mented on a software level. Normally Class 2 Bluetooth 
devices are used for automotive applications, which enable 
a range of 10 meters, but there are demonstrations which 
show that this range can be extended with amplifiers and 
antennas (Checkoway et al., 2011). To attack the Bluetooth 
interface, a paired Bluetooth device is required. It might 
cause some problems for the attacker to establish a Bluetooth 
connection, but these devices are designed to handle multi-
ple paired devices. When the attacker has a paired connec-
tion, with analyzing and reverse engineering it is possible 
to find the weaknesses of the software (for example unsafe 
usage of memory allocation or copy functions).
2.3 Long range wireless attacks
Last but not least, vehicles also provide the possibility 
to establish long distance (greater than 1 km) digital con-
nection. These channels can be classified in two groups: 
broadcast channels and addressable channels.
In case of broadcast channels, the messages are not spe-
cifically sent to a given vehicle. Additionally, long-range 
broadcast mediums can also be used as control channels 
(for example in case of a malicious intervention), because 
in their cases the it is even more difficult to identify the per-
petrator, through these channels multiple receivers can be 
commanded at once, and they do not make it necessary 
for attackers to know the precise parameters of the car. 
The modern automobile can include many broadcast receiv-
ers for long-range signals: Global Positioning System (GPS) 
(Kis and Lantos, 2013), Satellite Radio, Digital Radio, Radio 
Data System (RDS) and Traffic Message Channel (TMC) 
where signals are transmitted as digital subcarriers on exist-
ing FM-bands (Farkas and Telek, 2018).
In case of addressable channels, the most important part 
is the continuous availability of the attack surface owing 
to the telematics systems which provide continuous connec-
tivity via cellular voice and data networks. These systems 
offer several useful features for the car owner, for example 
supporting safety (crash reporting), diagnostics (early alert 
of mechanical issues), anti-theft (remote track and disable), 
and convenience (hands-free data access such as driving 
directions or weather) (Checkoway et al., 2011), but also offer 
advantages for attackers: they can be accessed over arbitrary 
distance (due to the wide coverage of cellular data infra-
structure) in an environment reasonably supporting the ano-
nymity of the malicious intervention. These channels typi-
cally have relatively high bandwidth, are two-way channels 
(supporting interactive control and data exfiltration), and are 
individually addressable (Checkoway et al., 2011).
2.4 Automotive communication systems
We have seen that there are several opportunities to gain 
access to the vehicle's internal communication channels. 
Now let's investigate, how we can exploit that access. 
In the following session CAN and on Automotive Ethernet 
is discussed.
2.4.1 CAN attacks
Once the attacker gained access to the CAN bus, there are 
multiple possibilities to continue with. In order to under-
stand these possibilities, it is required to have a little 
understanding of CAN communication. CAN is a broad-
casted protocol with maximum 8 bytes of data. At the 
beginning of each message there is an 11-bit long iden-
tifier. Typically, ECUs will broadcast messages and other 
ECUs that are interested (decided by CAN ID) will listen 
for those messages and ignore the rest. However, the CAN 
ID does not only identify a message, but also define its pri-
ority (CAN arbitration). Based on these basic rules, we can 
easily imagine different attack scenarios.
2.4.2 Spoofed messages
In this kind of attack, the attacker tries to send a spoofed 
message simulating that it is valid message, generated by a 
real, existing ECU. The attacker uses a fake node ID which 
is not assigned in the CAN message. Attacker has a high 
chance to inject 8 bytes long spoofed messages without 
the risk of detecting the intrusion. If the attacker changes 
a single bit in the message, then the probability of being 
detected increases to 0.39 % (Checkoway et al., 2011).
2.4.3 Replay attacks
In a replay attack, an attacker sniffs the CAN message and 
captures the data from the sniffed dump. After doing this, 
the attacker replays the message after some amount of 
time. The attacker can also send duplicated messages in the 
CAN network. As CAN does not support authentication of 
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the message, receiver ECU cannot identify the data in the 
message and performs the function which is in the CAN 
packet. For instance, an attacker changes the data in the 
CAN packet if he wants to attack the brakes of a vehi-
cle. He would send the false packet once on the network 
which will launch the attack on the vehicle. But if he keeps 
on sending the packet continuously, the brakes would stop 
functioning (Checkoway et al., 2011).
2.4.4 Message injection
We can distinguish three types of message injection. 
First type, if an attacker wants to target a single function 
of a vehicle (e.g., access to doors), then he would send 
a message with single CAN ID to the CAN bus. Sending 
repeated messages will operate the vehicle according to 
the injected message. Second, if an attacker wants to attack 
a system as a whole rather than a single part of the vehi-
cle, he would use multiple random CAN IDs. For example, 
if an attacker wants to stop a vehicle, he would attack on 
the brakes of the vehicle then kill the engine. This would 
force the user of the vehicle to stop the vehicle. Third, the 
attacker may circulate a huge amount of CAN messages 
which can disrupt the normal functioning and communi-
cation of CAN bus. As the capacity of CAN bus is 1 Mbps, 
attacker can create huge traffic on the bus. CAN bus would 
not be able to handle such a huge traffic and would fail 
to function in an appropriate manner. Quantitatively, each 
CAN message consists of 128 bits and three inter-frame 
spaces which are of 1 bit between messages. Hence, the 
attacker can launch a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack 
by generating 8000 messages per second (Pan et al., 2017).
2.4.5 Automotive Ethernet attacks
With the demand for higher bandwidth Automotive Ethernet 
is getting more and more popular nowadays. It offers a huge 
amount of advantages in the field of infotainment system and 
autonomous functions, but it also means a dangerous attack 
channel. On the one hand, since the Automotive Ethernet 
is based on the regular Ethernet protocol, there are tons 
of possible attack methods, which can be applied. On the 
other hand, there are automotive protocols, which are rela-
tively fresh, therefore they can contain vulnerabilities which 
are not yet known. Previous researches have already inves-
tigated the protocols of Automotive Ethernet (Talic, 2017) 
form security point of view. According to the results, it is 
possible to inject messages which enable the attacker to clas-
sify himself as a proper participant of the communication, 
disturb data exchange and the flow of the communication.
3 Detection of penetration
The main goal is to detect messages on the network which 
are sent by the attacker. In order to achieve this, we need 
an intrusion detection system. After the attack begun, 
the intrusion detection system either can raise a warning 
in the direction of the driver, if necessary, or can just sim-
ply filter the corrupted messages.
3.1 Intrusion detection on CAN bus
Pan et al. (2017) suggest different approaches for intrusion 
detection on the CAN bus. One of them is an algorith-
mic approach. This method can grant protection against 
the denial of service type of attacks. A monitoring system 
is set up on the network, which identifies the repetition 
in the messages, and increases the belonging counters. 
If the counters reach a pre-defined threshold, an alarm is 
triggered, which indicates the intrusion process.
Another detection method is the DMS (data manage-
ment system (Miller and Valasek, 2014)). In this case 
the CAN messages are sent through an observer to iden-
tify malicious events on the network. There are three main 
different approaches to apply DMS: centralized, distrib-
uted, hybrid. In the centralized solution, all traffic pass 
through the central DMS. It improves the maintainabil-
ity, but has the disadvantage that if the central point gets 
compromised, all data on the network will be threatened. 
In the distributed solution, multiple ECUs handle the data 
monitoring, which gives a solution to the disadvantage of 
centralized model, however it increases the traffic on the 
network which may result in bottleneck or crucial capac-
ity allocation problems. The third approach is a hybrid 
solution, which mixes the centralized and distributed 
approach, keeping their advantages.
The last detection possibility is a security based solu-
tion (Pan et al., 2017). The heart of this method is an algo-
rithm, which uses encryption and authentication of the nodes 
during the system start-up period. An ECU is assigned 
as master ECU, which consists of a key and a serial num-
ber. When the vehicle is started, specific processes come 
off between the master ECU and all the other ECUs on the 
network. The master ECU generates two randomly gener-
ated numbers, and gives them to all other ECUs. The other 
ECUs perform some functions using these two numbers, 
and send back the results to the master ECU. If the value 
is matched with the stored expected value, then the ECU is 
valid. This would detect any malicious node on the network.
As a summary, it can be stated that if the intrusion is 
aimed to be defined based on the communication, a method 
Kocsis et al.
Period. Polytech. Transp. Eng. |5
similar to the firewall concept is necessary. This firewall 
should be placed between the external access interface and 
the network itself. On the one hand the task of this fire-
wall is to filter out messages coming from the cyber space, 
which would eliminate many malicious attacks at rela-
tively low cost; on the other hand the firewall should act 
as filter. Before the packet is sent to the network, it should 
go through the firewall. There the packet can be compared 
to the packets stored in the database, can be compared to 
previously sent packets, statistics and other measurements 
can be made, which can be useful to decide whether the 
system is under attack or not. Besides the firewall, encryp-
tion methods can also be used to make the attack harder.
Although, it has been introduced that the detection 
approaches can be centralized, distributed and hybrid, 
there is only one layer, the firewall between the net-
work and the attacker. If this is broken, the attacker has 
full access to the network. To address this disadvan-
tage, a good solution is the HSS (Hybrid Security System 
(Rizvi et al., 2017)), which consists of multiple protection 
layers. HSS consists of three layers, a layer similar to fire-
wall, and the HSP (hybrid security program) layer, which 
communicates with the HSS resource layer. When a packet 
passes through the firewall, it decides if the packet is 
trusted or untrusted. If it is trusted, the firewall allows 
the packet to pass through. If it is untrusted, the firewall 
blocks the packet. In addition, a flag is generated in the 
firewall independent HSS system. There is two type of 
flags: yellow flag and black flag. If a packet tries to pass 
through, after predefined amount of occasions a yellow 
flag is generated. After the flag handler receives enough 
yellow flags, a black flag is generated, which generates 
a filtering rule update and sends it to all ECUs firewall.
4 Classification of security levels
The SAE refers to two security classification methods, 
which provide engineering process suggestions aligned to 
ISO 26262 (Martin et al., 2017; Salay et al., 2018) standard: 
HEAVENS (HEAling Vulnerabilities to ENhance Software 
security and safety) and EVITA (E-Safety Vehicle Intrusion 
Protected Applications) (Cheah et al., 2018). Now I will 
describe the EVITA method and define additional improve-
ment suggestion in regard to its methodology.
The classification method consists of three steps. 
The first step is the threat modelling. This is the most criti-
cal step, because this will be the base of the following pro-
cesses. This is a manual process based on expert knowl-
edge. The best way to model the threats is an attack tree. 
Attack trees are diagrams, which represent the actions 
that are required to achieve the goal. The attacks tree 
has events, and between events there are logical connec-
tion (and, or, etc.). The outcome of the attack trees serves 
as a starting point for the next step, the penetration test-
ing. However, this outcome could be used also as a start-
ing point of other safety methods (Ghadi et al., 2019; 
Gopalakrishnan et al., 2018), like FMEA (Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis) (Hajiagha et al., 2016). In order to 
achieve this, the attack potential number has to be intro-
duced to every step in the attack tree, which can be import-
ant from security point of view. This number should be 
generated based on three properties: the difficulty to 
achieve the attack, the probability, that someone is able 
to implement the attack, and the reliability of the detec-
tion method which could identify the attack. Table 1 shows 
the generation process of the introduced parameter.
As we can see, the attack difficulties have an incremental 
scale beginning from the basic complexity to nearly impos-
sibly difficult attacks. These values can be interpreted 
based on the amount of the effort being required to exe-
cute and implement the given attack. Therefore, the easier 
to execute an attack the higher its potential is. The situation 
is the same with the probability, the higher the probability 
the higher its potential is. Now if the sum the two values is 
calculated, the result is between 2 and 8. In this framework 
the detection method cab be represented as a multiplier. 
In this case the more advanced the detection method is, 
the lower the multiplier is. As a result, no an attack poten-
tial value can be generated between 2 and 10. With this 
approach, it is possible to describe, compare and consider 
Table 1 Attack potential calculation
Attack difficulty
Basic 4
Advanced 3
Hard 2
Nearly impossible 1
Attack probability
Likely 4
Possible 3
Unlikely 2
Very unlikely 1
Detection methods
No detection 1.25
Central detection 1.2
Distributed detection 1.1
Hybrid detection 1
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different attack types during the design period of in-vehi-
cle automotive communication networks.
The next step is the penetration testing. The penetra-
tion testing is a specific analysis method focusing on the 
security characteristic of the vehicle. The goal is to collect 
the vulnerabilities and try to exploit them. Regarding pen-
etration testing, methods can be classified into two groups. 
Let's call the first group to automated penetration tests. 
The tests of this group check a huge number of parame-
ters, which can strongly affect vulnerabilities (for example 
brute force scanning of ports). The other group should con-
tain the expert analyses, which are based on the results of 
the tests in the first group on the one hand, and on the other 
hand they are based on technical experiences and creative 
ideas. The outcome of the penetration test is a report, 
which can be used as a starting point for the classification.
The last part of the investigation is the classification 
procedure, which is based on Table 2 in case of EVITA.
Besides that, the attack potential calculated based on 
Table 1 gives a starting point for EVITA classification. 
Furthermore it also can be used to extend the FMEA pro-
cedure, which is developed to explore failure possibilities 
and their effects. Its goal is to identify and localize failure 
possibilities and support their prevention. During the FMEA 
process, a number, between 1 and 10, should be matched 
to each property group of each failure. These groups are 
the possibility of occurrence (O), the severity of the failure 
from the user point of view (S), and the ability for detec-
tion (D). As a result, three indicator numbers between 1 and 
10 are defined, therefore if they are multiplied by each other, 
the risk priority number (RPM) can be generated, with a 
value between 1 and 1000. Based on SAE recommended 
practice (SAE, 2016), if the RPM is below 125, no action is 
required, if the RPM is between 125 and 420, further anal-
ysis is required, and if the RPM is over 420, intervention 
is required. Since attack potential number has been defined 
with a value between 2 and 10, it provides a great opportunity 
to integrate it into the FMEA. If our previous indicator num-
bers are multiplied by the attack potential (A), the following 
result can be achieved: RPM = O * S * D * A, which means 
a number between 2 and 10000. Based on the previous clas-
sification, introduce new thresholds can be introduced: if the 
RPM is under 1000, no further action is required, if the RPM 
is between 1000 and 3360, further analysis is required, and 
if the RPM is over 3360, intervention is required.
5 Examples
In this paragraph some examples are given, how an attack 
tree can be created discussed in the previous section, 
and the calculation method related to the attack potential 
is introduced.
On Fig. 1 there is the textual attack tree of this given 
scenario: there is an ECU in a car, which communicates 
over the air with TCP/IP based protocols. The commu-
nication is not encrypted, but the ECU is not connected 
to safety critical systems, and the attacker has full access 
to the network. The goal of the attack has to be defined, 
and now the goal is data mining. The SAND keyword 
stands for sequential logical and, which means we execute 
the given steps after each other. The AND and OR key-
words stand for logical and and logical or. As we can see, 
the attack process begins with reconnaissance. This means 
that the attacker tries to get as much information about 
the system as he can. This includes processing the prop-
erties of the messages present on the network, trying to 
figure out parameters and properties with different kind of 
Table 2 EVITA classification
Class Safety Privacy Financial Operational
0 No injuries. No unauthorized access to data. No financial loss.
No impact on operational 
performance
1 Light / moderate injuries. Anonymous data only. Low-level financial loss
Operational impact not 
discernible to driver.
2
Severe and life-threatening 
injuries (survival probable) 
or light/moderate injuries 
for multiple vehicles.
Identification of vehicle 
or driver.
Moderate financial loss, or low 
losses for multiple vehicles.
Driver aware of performance 
degradation, or indiscernible 
operational impacts 
for multiple vehicles.
3
Life threatening 
(survival uncertain) or fatal 
injuries, or severe injuries 
for multiple vehicles.
Driver or vehicle tracking, 
or identification of driver 
or vehicle for multiple vehicles.
Heavy financial loss, 
or moderate losses 
for multiple vehicles.
Significant impact 
on operational performance, 
or noticeable operational impact 
for multiple vehicles.
4
Life threatening or fatal injuries 
for multiple vehicles.
Driver or vehicle tracking 
for multiple vehicles.
Heavy financial losses 
for multiple vehicles.
Significant operational impact 
for multiple vehicles.
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probes, and gathering statistical data. Besides the descrip-
tion of the steps there are the indicator numbers based 
on Table 1. As it can be seen, waiting for messages and 
gather the MAC and IP addresses has a high attack poten-
tial, because it is a basic and attack with a relatively high 
probability, without any detection mechanism. The TCP 
SYN probe (Vetrella et al., 2019) has already lower values, 
because it is a more difficult attack with some detection 
methods built in, but it still gives a relatively high attack 
potential (6,6); which already can be a heavy multiplier 
in the further analysis (previous section). After the hacker 
gathered enough information, the hacking process can be 
started. This includes connection to ports, and sending 
messages (in multiple communication layers). As a last 
step, the answer messages on the network have to be eval-
uated, and then datamining process can be performed.
Fig. 2 shows the attack tree of a message injection attack 
represented in a diagrammatic form (Wang et al., 2018). 
According to the assumed scenario the hacker is able 
to infect a third party hardware which is connected to 
the car's OBD II port, therefore he has a chance to create 
malfunction on the CAN network. Following the attack 
tree, after the connection the hacker is able to detect and 
record messages, and also generate messages. After the 
detection phase, the hacker can play back the earlier mes-
sages, but can also generate own CAN messages. However, 
this figure does not contain the attack potential indicator 
numbers, it can be concluded, that the message genera-
tion phase has a high attack potential, because it is a basic 
attack type with relatively high probability value, with a 
detection multiplier of 1-1,2, since there supposed to be 
some built in detection mechanism.
Fig. 3 shows the last example, which is a Denial of 
Service attack against a Bluetooth interface. After start-
ing the Bluetooth discovery process, the attacker has mul-
tiple possibilities to gather enough information for pair-
ing. One the connection is established, the DOS attack 
(Zhang et al., 2018) can be started either by playing back 
previously recorded messages, or by injecting randomly 
generated messages. However, the attack potentials will 
Fig. 1 Data mining attack tree
Fig. 2 Message injection attack tree
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be a bit lower in this case because of the increased dif-
ficulty, the multiplier is still relevant. If we think a bit 
about the extended FMEA RPM number introduced in the 
previous section, we can imagine a relatively high RPM 
number, since the severity can be high, if the Bluetooth 
interface has control over the speakers and can produce 
for example sudden, loud noises.
6 Summary
Summing up the results, the document has presented 
the applicable attack methodologies targeting to break 
the security systems of a road vehicle. The paper has also 
discussed the detection possibilities, and has introduced 
a novel ranking system based on the security mechanism 
of the given intervention. As a new result, an attack poten-
tial number has been introduced, which is based on the 
attack probability, attack difficulty and detection methods. 
With the introduced novel attack potential indicator a new 
extension of FMEA approach has been prepared.
Although, the security related evaluation techniques 
(Abdo et al., 2018) requires a lot of abstraction and some-
times it seems to be difficult to work out and apply objec-
tive evaluation methodologies, it has been introduced 
that a parameter based, quantifiable approach can pro-
vide objective basis for security related decision pro-
cesses. Nonetheless it still requires a lot of imagination 
and experience to identify the possible attack channels, 
and quantify probabilities and characteristics. Even if 
such an analysis is prepared, the industry has to be ready 
to continuously improve the security aspects, to keep 
abreast of the advanced methods and technology of 
malicious interventions.
Fig. 3 DOS attack tree
Kocsis et al.
Period. Polytech. Transp. Eng. |9
References
Abdo, H., Kaouk, M., Flaus, J.-M., Masse, F. (2018) "A safety/security 
risk analysis approach of Industrial Control Systems: A cyber 
bowtie–combining new version of attack tree with bowtie analy-
sis", Computers & Security, 72, pp. 175–195.
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2017.09.004
Cheah, M., Shaikh, S. A., Bryans, J., Wooderson, P. (2018) "Building 
an automotive security assurance case using systematic security 
evaluations", Computers & Security, 77, pp. 360–379.
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2018.04.008
Checkoway, S., McCoy, D., Kantor, B., Anderson, D., Shacham, H., 
Savage, S., Koscher, K., Czeskis, A., Roesner, F., Kohno, T. 
(2011) "Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive 
Attack Surfaces", In: 20th USENIX Conference on Security, 
San Francisco, USA, pp. 77–92.
Farkas, C., Telek, M. (2018) "Capacity Planning of Electric Car Charging 
Station Based on Discrete Time Observations and MAP (2) /G/c 
Queue", Periodica Polytechnica Electrical Engineering and 
Computer Science, 62(3), pp. 82–89.
 https://doi.org/10.3311/PPee.11841
Ghadi, M., Török, Á., Tánczos, K. (2019) "Integration of Probability 
and Clustering Based Approaches in the Field of Black Spot 
Identification", Periodica Polytechnica Civil Engineering, 63(1), 
pp. 46–52.
 https://doi.org/10.3311/PPci.11753
Gopalakrishnan, K., Gholami, H., Vidyadharan, A., Choudhary, A., 
Agrawal, A. (2018) "Crack Damage Detection in Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle Images of Civil Infrastructure Using Pre-trained Deep 
Learning Model", International Journal for Traffic and Transport 
Engineering, 8(1), pp. 1–14.
 https://doi.org/10.7708/ijtte.2018.8(1).01
Hajiagha, S. H. R., Hashemi, S. S., Mohammadi, Y., Zavadskas, E. K. 
(2016) "Fuzzy Belief Structure Based VIKOR Method: 
An Application for Ranking Delay Causes of Tehran Metro System 
by FMEA Criteria", Transport, 31(1), pp. 108–118.
 https://doi.org/10.3846/16484142.2016.1133454
Kis, L., Lantos, B. (2013) "High precision GPS positioning with mul-
tiple receivers using carrier phase technique and sensor fusion", 
Periodica Polytechnica Electrical Engineering and Computer 
Science, 57(3), pp. 83–97.
 https://doi.org/10.3311/PPee.2102
Martin, H., Tschabuschnig, K., Bridal, O., Watzenig, D. (2017) 
"Functional Safety of Automated Driving Systems: Does ISO 
26262 Meet the Challenges?", In: Watzenig, D., Horn, M. (eds.) 
Automated Driving: Safer and More Efficient Future Driving, 
Springer, Cham, Switzerland, pp. 387–416.
 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31895-0_16
Miller, C., Valasek, C. (2014) "A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack 
Surfaces", [online] Available at: http://illmatics.com/remote%20
attack%20surfaces.pdf [Accessed: 21 May 2018]
Pan, L., Zheng, X., Chen, H. X., Luan, T., Bootwala, H., Batten, L. (2017) 
"Cyber security attacks to modern vehicular systems", Journal of 
Information Security and Applications, 36, pp. 90–100.
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2017.08.005
Rizvi, S., Willet, J., Perino, D., Marasco, S., Condo, C. (2017) "A Threat 
to Vehicular Cyber Security and the Urgency for Correction", 
Procedia Computer Science, 114, pp. 100–105.
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2017.09.021
SAE Vehicle Cybersecurity Systems Engineering Committee (2016) 
"SAE J3061_201601 Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical 
Vehicle Systems", SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers) 
International, USA.
 https://doi.org/10.4271/J3061_201601
Salay, R., Queiroz, R., Czarnecki, K. (2018) "An Analysis of ISO 26262: 
Machine Learning and Safety in Automotive Software", 
SAE Technical Paper, 2018-01-1075.
 https://doi.org/10.4271/2018-01-1075
Szíjj, A., Buttyán, L., Szalay, Zs. "Hacking cars in the style of 
Stuxnet", [pdf] Laboratory of Cryptography and System 
Security, Budapest, Hungary, Available at: http://www.hit.
bme.hu/~buttyan/publications/carhacking-Hacktivity-2015.pdf 
[Accessed: 20 November 2018]
Talic, A. (2017) "Security Analysis of Ethernet in Cars", MSc Thesis, 
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, [online] Available at: https://
people.kth.se/~maguire/DEGREE-PROJECT-REPORTS/171006-
Ammar_Talic_with_cover.pdf [Accessed: 12 June 2018]
Tettamanti, T., Varga, I., Szalay, Z. (2016) "Impacts of Autonomous Cars 
from a Traffic Engineering Perspective", Periodica Polytechnica 
Transportation Engineering, 44(4), pp. 244–250.
 https://doi.org/10.3311/PPtr.9464
Vetrella, A. R., Causa, F., Renga, A., Fasano, G., Accardo, D., Grassi, M. 
(2019) "Multi-UAV Carrier Phase Differential GPS and Vision-
based Sensing for High Accuracy Attitude Estimation", Journal of 
Intelligent & Robotic Systems, 93(1-2), pp. 245–260.
 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10846-018-0821-9
Wang, Q., Lu, Z., Qu, G. (2018) "An Entropy Analysis based Intrusion 
Detection System for Controller Area Network in Vehicles", 
[manuscript] Computer Science, Cryptography and Security 
(cs.CR), arXiv:1808.04046, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA.
Zhang, H., Qi, Y., Wu, J., Fu, L., He, L. (2018) "DoS Attack Energy 
Management Against Remote State Estimation", IEEE Transactions 
on Control of Network Systems, 5(1), pp. 383–394.
 https://doi.org/10.1109/TCNS.2016.2614099
Zöldy, M. (2018) "Legal Barriers of Utilization of Autonomous Vehicles 
as Part of Green Mobility", In: Burnete, N., Varga, B. O. (eds.) 
Proceedings of the 4th International Congress of Automotive 
and Transport Engineering (AMMA 2018), Springer, Cham, 
Switzerland, pp. 243–248.
 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94409-8_29
Acknowledgement
The research reported in this paper was supported by the 
Higher Education Excellence Program of the Ministry of 
Human Capacities in the frame of Artificial Intelligence 
research area of Budapest University of Technology and 
Economics (BME FIKP-MI/FM).
